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n February, 2008, British 
environment minister Phil Woolas 
sparked a major row in the United 
Kingdom when he attributed the high 
rate of birth defects in the Pakistani 
community to the practice of marriages 
between first cousins. “If you have a 
child with your cousin, the likelihood 
is there’ll be a genetic problem,” he 
told the Sunday Times [1]. Although 
a Muslim activist group demanded 
that Woolas be fired, he was instead 
promoted in October to the racially 
sensitive post of immigration minister. 
Most of his constituents would surely 
have shared Woolas’ view that the risk 
to offspring from first-cousin marriage 
is unacceptably high—as would many 
Americans. Indeed, in the United 
States, similar assumptions about the 
high level of genetic risk associated 
with cousin marriage are reflected in 
the 31 state laws that either bar the 
practice outright or permit it only 
where the couple obtains genetic 
counseling, is beyond reproductive age, 
or if one partner is sterile. When and 
why did such laws become popular, 
and is the sentiment that informs them 
grounded in scientific fact?
US prohibitions on cousin 
marriage date to the Civil War and 
its immediate aftermath. The first 
ban was enacted by Kansas in 1858, 
with Nevada, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Washington, New Hampshire, 
Ohio, and Wyoming following suit in 
the 1860s. Subsequently, the rate of 
increase in the number of laws was 
nearly constant until the mid-1920s; 
only Kentucky (1946), Maine (1985), 
and Texas (2005) have since banned 
cousins from marrying. (Several 
other efforts ultimately failed when 
bills were either vetoed by a governor 
or passed by only one house of a 
legislature; e.g., in 2000, the Maryland 
House of Delegates approved a ban 
by a vote of 82 to 46, but the bill died 
in the Senate.) The accompanying 
map (Figure 1) illustrates both the 
extent and the progress of legislation. 
It demonstrates that western states 
are disproportionately represented, 
reflecting the fact that either as 
territories or newly admitted states, 
they were writing their marriage codes 
from scratch and hence prompted to 
explicitly confront the issue. For the 
same reason, these states tended to be 
the first to prohibit cousin marriage.
Perhaps surprisingly, these bans are 
not attributable to the rise of eugenics. 
Popular assumptions about hereditary 
risk and an associated need to control 
reproduction were widespread before 
the emergence of an organized 
eugenics movement around the turn 
of the 20th century. Indeed, most 
prominent American eugenists were, at 
best, lukewarm about the laws, which 
they thought both indiscriminate in 
their effects and difficult to enforce 
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Figure 1. Map of the United States Showing States with Laws Forbidding First-Cousin Marriage
Different colors reflect differences in the timing of passage of the laws. Colorado is shaded because 
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[2]. In the view of many eugenists, 
sterilization of the unfit would be a far 
more effective means of improving the 
race.
Nonetheless, in both the US and 
Europe, the frequency of first-cousin 
marriage—a practice that had often 
been favored, especially by elites—
sharply declined during the second half 
of the 19th century [3]. (The reasons 
are both complex and contested, but 
likely include improved transportation 
and communication, which increased 
the range of marriage partners; a 
decline in family size, which limited the 
number of marriageable cousins; and 
greater female mobility and autonomy 
[4,5].) The fact that no European 
country barred cousins from marrying, 
while many US states did and still do, 
has often been interpreted as proof of 
a special American animosity toward 
the practice [6]. But this explanation 
ignores a number of factors, including 
the ease with which a handful of 
highly motivated activists—or even 
one individual—can be effective in 
the decentralized American system, 
especially when feelings do not run 
high on the other side of an issue. 
The recent Texas experience, where 
a state representative quietly tacked 
an amendment barring first-cousin 
marriage onto a child protection bill, is 
a case in point. 
The laws must also be viewed in 
the context of a new, post–Civil War 
acceptance of the need for state 
oversight of education, commerce, and 
health and safety, including marriage 
and the family. Beginning in the 1860s, 
many states passed anti-miscegenation 
laws, increased the statutory age of 
marriage, and adopted or expanded 
medical and mental-capacity 
restrictions in marriage law [7]. Thus, 
laws prohibiting cousin marriage were 
but one aspect of a more general 
trend to broaden state authority in 
areas previously considered private. 
And unlike the situation in Britain 
and much of Europe, cousin marriage 
in the US was associated not with the 
aristocracy and upper middle class but 
with much easier targets: immigrants 
and the rural poor. In any case, by the 
late nineteenth century, in Europe as 
well as the US, marrying one’s cousin 
had come to be viewed as reckless, and 
today, despite its continued popularity 
in many societies and among European 
elites historically, the practice is highly 
stigmatized in the West (and parts of 
Asia—the People’s Republic of China, 
Taiwan, and both North and South 
Korea also prohibit cousin marriage) 
[8–11]. The ironic humor of a New 
Zealand beer advertisement (Figure 2) 
nicely reflects current opinion in much 
of the world. But is the practice as risky 
as many people assume?
Until recently, good data on which 
to base an answer were lacking. As a 
result, great variation existed in the 
medical advice and screening services 
offered to consanguineous couples 
[12]. In an effort at clarification, the 
National Society of Genetic Counselors 
(NSGC) convened a group of experts 
to review existing studies on risks to 
offspring and issue recommendations 
for clinical practice. Their report 
concluded that the risks of a first-cousin 
union were generally much smaller 
than assumed—about 1.7%–2% above 
the background risk for congenital 
defects and 4.4% for pre-reproductive 
mortality—and did not warrant any 
special preconception testing. In 
the authors’ view, neither the stigma 
that attaches to such unions in North 
America nor the laws that bar them 
were scientifically well-grounded. 
When dealing with worried clients, the 
authors advised genetic counselors to 
“normalize” such unions by discussing 
their high frequency in some parts 
of the world and providing examples 
of prominent cousin couples, such as 
Charles Darwin and Emma Wedgwood 
[13].
In the aftermath of controversies 
ignited by Woolas’s comments and 
similar remarks in 2005 by Labour 
Member of Parliament Ann Cryer, who 
asserted “We have to stop this tradition 
of first cousin marriages” [14,15], the 
NSGC report was cited by numerous 
scientific, legal, and lay commentators 
as testament to the low risk of cousin 
marriage and hence the lack of any 
compelling biological reason to avoid 
it. (Literally dozens of authors also 
asserted that the Darwins had ten 
healthy children—despite the deaths of 
three of them in infancy or childhood 
and Charles Darwin’s own worries 
that consanguinity had affected the 
health and fertility of the intermarried 
Darwin and Wedgwood families, 
and of his and Emma’s offspring in 
particular [2,16].) Although the report 
warned against generalizing from 
(and hence by implication to) more 
inbred populations, many writers, 
roughly averaging the statistics for birth 
defects and pre-reproductive mortality, 
noted that first-cousin marriage “only” 
increases the risk of adverse events by 
about 3%. But for several reasons, any 
overall calculation of risk is in fact quite 
complicated.
First, even assuming that the 
deleterious phenotype arises solely 
from homozygosity at a single locus, 
the increased risk depends on the 
frequency of the allele involved; it is 
not an immediate consequence of 
the degree of relatedness between 
cousins. (Interestingly, despite the 
British biometricians’ harsh criticism 
of Mendelism, they were the first to 
describe this dependency in 1911 
[17,18].) If a deleterious recessive 
allele has a frequency q, the ratio of the 
recessive phenotype in the offspring 
of first cousins relative to a panmictic 
population is (1 + 15q)/16q, which 
means the increase in risk is greater 
for rarer conditions [19]. For example, 
if q is 0.01, the ratio is 7.2; if q is 0.001, 
it is 63.4. Consequently, statistics 
on the risks associated with cousin 
marriage are necessarily averages across 
many traits, and they are likely to be 
different for different populations, 
which will often vary in the frequency 
of particular deleterious alleles. In 
the Pakistani immigrant population, 
for example, the quoted high average 
rate of birth defects may mask a single 
trait (or small number of traits) at 
very high frequency, a situation with 
different medical consequences from 
one characterized by a larger number 
of less-frequent disorders.
Second, children of cousin 
marriages are likely to manifest an 
increased frequency of birth defects 
showing polygenic inheritance and 
interacting with environmental 
variation. But as the NSGC report 
notes, calculating the increased 
frequency of such quantitative traits 
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060320.g002
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is not straightforward, and properly 
controlled studies are lacking. 
Moreover, socio-economic and other 
environmental influences will vary 
among populations, which can easily 
confound the effects of consanguinity. 
Inbred populations, including British 
Pakistanis, are often poor. The mother 
may be malnourished to begin with, 
and families may not seek or have 
access to good prenatal care, which may 
be unavailable in their native language 
[20]. Hence it is difficult to separate 
out genetic from socio-economic and 
other environmental factors.
Third, as the report also notes, the 
degree of increased risk depends on 
the mean coefficient of inbreeding 
for the population. That is, whether 
first-cousin marriage is an occasional 
or regular occurrence in the study 
population matters, and it is thus 
inappropriate to extrapolate findings 
from largely outbred populations with 
occasional first-cousin marriages to 
populations with high coefficients of 
inbreeding and vice-versa. Standard 
calculations, such as the commonly 
cited 3% additional risk, examine 
a pedigree in which the ancestors 
(usually grandparents) are assumed 
to be unrelated. In North America, 
marriages between consanguineal kin 
are strongly discouraged. But such an 
assumption is unwarranted in the case 
of UK Pakistanis, who have emigrated 
from a country where such marriage is 
traditional and for whom it is estimated 
that roughly 55%–59% of marriages 
continue to be between first cousins 
[21–23]. Thus, the usual risk estimates 
are misleading: data from the English 
West Midlands suggest that British 
Pakistanis account for only ~4.1% of 
births, but about 33% of the autosomal 
recessive metabolic errors recorded at 
birth [24]. However, for a variety of 
reasons (including fear that a cousin 
marriage would result in their being 
blamed for any birth defects), UK 
Pakistanis are less likely to use prenatal 
testing and to terminate pregnancies 
[20,25]. Thus the population 
attributable risk of genetic diseases at 
birth due to inbreeding may be skewed 
by prenatal elimination of affected 
fetuses in non-inbred populations. 
Moreover, the consequences of 
prolonged inbreeding are not always 
obvious. The uniting of deleterious 
recessives by inbreeding may also lead 
to these alleles being purged from 
the population. The frequency of 
such deleterious alleles, then, may be 
decreased, which (as shown above) 
means the relative risk is greater, even as 
the absolute risk decreases.
For all these reasons, the increased 
population-level genetic risks arising 
from cousin marriage can only be 
estimated empirically, and those 
estimates are likely to be specific to 
particular populations in specific 
environments. And of course for 
particular couples, the risks depend 
on their individual genetic makeup. 
It is also worth noting that both the 
increased absolute and relative risk 
may be relevant to assessing the 
consequences of consanguineous 
marriage. If the background risk of a 
particular genetic disorder were one 
in a million, a ten-fold increase in 
relative risk would likely be considered 
negligible, because the absolute 
increase is nevertheless minuscule. 
Conversely, the doubling of an absolute 
risk of 10% would surely be considered 
unacceptable. But the doubling of 
a background 3% risk may fall on a 
borderline, with the increase capable of 
being framed as either large or small. 
In any case, different commentators 
have certainly interpreted the same risk 
of cousin marriage as both insignificant 
and as alarmingly high.
Those who characterize it as slight 
usually describe the risk in absolute 
terms and compare it with other risks 
of the same or greater magnitude that 
are generally considered acceptable. 
Thus it is often noted that women over 
the age of 40 are not prevented from 
childbearing, nor is anyone suggesting 
they should be, despite an equivalent 
risk of birth defects. Indeed, the 
argument goes, we do not question 
the right of people with Huntington 
disease or other autosomal dominant 
disorders to have children, despite a 
50% risk to offspring [26–29]. On the 
other hand, those who portray the risk 
as large tend to describe it in relative 
terms. For example, geneticist Philip 
Reilly commented: “A 7 to 8% chance 
is 50% greater than a 5% chance. 
That’s a significant difference.” They 
also tend to compare the risk with 
others that are generally considered 
unacceptable. Thus a doctor asks 
(rhetorically): “Would anyone 
knowingly take a medication that has 
double the risk of causing permanent 
brain damage?” [30,31].
In closing, we note that laws barring 
cousin marriage use coercive means 
to achieve a public purpose and thus 
would seem to qualify as eugenics even 
by the most restrictive of definitions. 
That they were a form of eugenics 
would once have been taken for 
granted. Thus J.B.S. Haldane argued 
that discouraging or prohibiting cousin 
marriage would appreciably reduce 
the incidence of a number of serious 
recessive conditions, and he explicitly 
characterized measures to do so as 
acceptable forms of eugenics [32]. But 
Haldane wrote before eugenics itself 
became stigmatized. Today, the term 
is generally reserved for practices we 
intend to disparage. That laws against 
cousin marriage are generally approved 
when they are thought about at all 
helps explain why they are seemingly 
exempt from that derogatory label.
It is obviously illogical to condemn 
eugenics and at the same time favor 
laws that prevent cousins from 
marrying. But we do not aim to indict 
these laws on the grounds that they 
constitute eugenics. That would 
assume what needs to be proved – that 
all forms of eugenics are necessarily 
bad. In our view, cousin marriage laws 
should be judged on their merits. 
But from that standpoint as well, they 
seem ill-advised. These laws reflect 
once-prevailing prejudices about 
immigrants and the rural poor and 
oversimplified views of heredity, 
and they are inconsistent with our 
acceptance of reproductive behaviors 
that are much riskier to offspring. They 
should be repealed, not because their 
intent was eugenic, but because neither 
the scientific nor social assumptions 
that informed them are any longer 
defensible.
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